criminal prosecution to focus on an innocent person? The answer lies primarily in the subtle hazards or traps that can make the process go awry. Some of the brightest scientists, judges, and detectives have fallen victim to these pitfalls. No one is immune. Researchers in the fi elds of cognitive psychology, forensic statistics, intelligence analysis, law, and the philosophy of science, however, have suggested some possible explanations, often grouping them into the three areas of cognitive biases, probability errors, and organizational traps. Like cascading failures in airplane crashes, an unsuccessful investigation often has more than one contributing cause.
To fully examine these pitfalls, the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin presents this article in two parts. The fi rst covers cognitive biases that can lead to criminal investigative failures and some strategies that can combat their occurrence.
COGNITIVE BIASES

Perception and Memory Limitations
People do not objectively survey their worlds. Rather, their experiences and expectations infl uence the decoding of sensory input (imperfect at best 1 ). Individuals view the world through different lenses, a fi ltering process that creates mind-sets. 2 Quick to form but resistant to change, mind-sets, while neither good nor bad, serve a purpose that under certain conditions can become problematic. Because perception is based on both awareness and understanding, humans often perceive what they expect to, thereby making premature conclusions dangerous. Communication 3 The brain does not objectively record data. Instead, memories are subjective interpretations, rarely reinterpreted even when circumstances change. New information becomes assimilated with old, which has more infl uence on the new than vice versa. Because people tend to remember positives and forget negatives, investigators may become ensnared in belief perseverance wherein they place more weight on evidence that supports their hypothesis than on clues that weaken it. 4 Remaining impartial and open-minded is the best way to accurately assess new information.
Research has shown that people can hold only fi ve to " " Some of the brightest scientists, judges, and detectives have fallen victim to these pitfalls. September 2006 / 3 nine items in their conscious memories at one time. 5 Information stored in long-term memory can be diffi cult to recall, and investigators may easily forget details irrelevant to their investigative theory, particularly in a complex case. Even if the information later becomes important, it can remain lost because of a failure to develop the neural pathways necessary for retrieval.
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Intuition
Most cognitive functioning occurs outside conscious awareness, including perception, information processing, memory, and some methods of decision making. 7 Humans employ two types of decision making, the intuitive and the rational. 8 Intuition falls between the automatic operations of perception and the deliberate processes of reasoning. Often misunderstood, intuition is not a paranormal ability or a form of extrasensory perception. Although it operates at a below-consciousness level, intuition still is based on normal sensory input. 
Heuristics and Biases
Clear and rational thinking does not come easily. People sometimes exhibit limited rationality in the face of life's complexities because the brain is not wired to deal effectively with uncertainty. Individuals, therefore, employ looking the other way, watching the accident scene. Fangio had fl eetingly observed a change in the color of the area of the stands in his peripheral vision. A normally light section from people=s faces had become dark from the hair on the back of their heads. Fangio, concentrating on his driving, only noticed this change at a below-consciousness level. But, at racing speeds, change meant risk, and Fangio automatically braked. Intuition helped him avoid the accident and win the race.
Automatic and effortless, intuition also is fast and powerful heuristics-rules of thumb that substitute simple questions for more complex ones-that typically operate at an intuitive level and work well most of the time. 13 Under certain conditions, however, heuristics can lead to cognitive biases, mental errors resulting from simplifi ed information processing.
14 Like optical illusions, cognitive biases are consistent and predictable and can result in distorted judgments and faulty analyses. To add to the problem, research has shown a poor correlation between confi dence and accuracy. Past a certain point, increased information leads to greater confi dence in the analyses but not necessarily greater accuracy.
Psychological researchers have identifi ed many heuristics and biases. Some of these can prove particularly problematic for criminal investigators.
Anchoring
The anchoring heuristic refers to the strong infl uence of the starting point or fi rst approximation on the fi nal estimate. 15 The prevailing situation and the information available at the time determine the fi rst approximation. Limited or incorrect data will skew the starting point, jeopardizing the path to a correct conclusion. Unfortunately, many murder cases fi rst appear to be something other than what they are.
Tunnel Vision and Satisfi cing
Tunnel vision (or incrementalism) develops from a narrow focus on a limited range of alternatives. "It results in the [police] offi cer becoming so focused upon an individual or incident that no other person or incident registers in the offi cer's thoughts. Thus, tunnel vision can result in the elimination of other suspects who should be investigated. Equally, events 2-year-old son was the only witness can illustrate these hazards. 17 Detectives received a tip regarding a man who, for the next year, became their investigative focus. After a covert operation to obtain further incriminating information, they fi nally arrested him. At the trial, the judge quickly threw out most of the prosecution's evidence, calling the covert operation misconceived. The charges were withdrawn, and the man was released. One detective later commented, "Maybe the team got an idée fi xe. Maybe they got stuck thinking it had to be [him] . No one dared to challenge that thinking until it got to the judge. But, it's a terrible mess." 18 Several years later, enhanced DNA from the victim's clothing pointed toward a psychopath now detained indefi nitely in a secure hospital. 19 Availability Availability refers to the ease by which previous examples come to mind. 20 People make judgments based only on what they remember, not on the totality of their experiences. They can recall recent and vivid events easily but fi nd disagreeable events diffi cult to remember. Individuals use the availability heuristic for determining how common or likely something is. Limited experience, therefore, can result that could lead to other suspects are eliminated from the offi cer's thinking."
16 Satisfi cing is the selection of the fi rst alternative that appears good enough. These heuristics might work well for simple errands, such as buying a hammer, but they are ill suited to the task of solving complex investigations.
The murder of an attractive 23-year-old female whose 
Framing
The presentation of information infl uences its interpretation. Called framing, this implies that information always is understood within a context. 21 An artifi cial or inappropriate context, however, can distort understanding. Dramatic examples of framing often take place in the courtroom, where opposing legal counsel present and argue variant positions on the particular events in dispute.
Representativeness
People often estimate the likelihood of an event by recalling a comparable incident and assuming the likelihood of the two are similar. This representativeness heuristic is partly prompted by the urge to categorize everything. Similarity in one aspect, however, does not imply similarity in others. For many years, Ted Bundy and his crimes drove the public's image of the typical serial killer case-sexual murders of women committed by an intelligent and mobile white male. But, not all serial murders are sex driven, and not all victims are female. Many serial murderers are nonwhite and below average in intelligence, and most commit their crimes within their home metropolitan area.
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Cause and Effect Biases
Perceptions of cause and effect are susceptible to several mental biases. Crime linkage could be undermined if an investigator fails to differentiate internal (psychological) from the cost of the scope), could assassinate John F. Kennedy, the president of the most powerful nation in the world. Instead, it remains more psychologically comfortable to believe in complicated conspiracy theories.
Illusory correlations can prove misleading on several levels. Events may appear correlated when, in fact, they are not. And, even if they are connected, correlation does not always equal causation. The relationship may be spurious or caused by an intervening event.
For instance, in a series of burglary rapes on the south side of a city, police theorized that the offender stalked his victims from a local superstore where all of the women had shopped. However, this superstore, the only one in the city, was so large that most people living in the area had gone there. Living on the south side, therefore, infl uenced both shopping and victimization patterns. There was no direct connection between the two, and their relationship was strictly spurious. As it turned out, the offender found his victims by prowling residential neighborhoods at night, looking through windows for women living alone.
Biases in Evaluation of Evidence
Problems with physical evidence usually result from misinterpretation, not from the external (situational) causes of behavior when examining offender modus operandi. The level of force used by a rapist, for example, may be contingent on the degree of victim resistance.
The identity fallacy holds that big events must have big causes. Conspiracy theories often are rooted in this belief. Many have found it diffi cult to accept that a loner like Lee Harvey Oswald, using a $21.45 rifl e ($12.78 for the rifl e plus
Strategies to Help Avoid Investigative Failures
Ensure managerial awareness of these problems through case study-based training.
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Encourage an atmosphere of open inquiry, ensuring investigative managers remain impartial and neutral. If possible, defer reaching conclusions until suffi cient data has been collected. Consider different perspectives and encourage crossfertilization of ideas, thereby avoiding tunnel vision. Organize brainstorming sessions and seek creativity, rather than consensus. Ensure that investigative managers willingly accept objections, doubts, and criticisms from team members. actual analysis. A police shooting in Alexandria, Egypt, after the First World War provides an intriguing example that also illustrates the risk of ignoring context. 23 During a foot pursuit, a police offi cer shot a robber who refused to halt (permissible under the law at the time). The criminal escaped but was later found dead. The offi cer stated he had fi red only once. During the postmortem examination, however, the local doctor discovered two bullet wounds, one entering the front of the robber's left thigh and still lodged in the leg muscle, and the other entering the back and exiting the abdomen. The doctor concluded, "He was shot twice.... First from the front at rather long range, secondly in the back-probably after he had fallen on his face." 24 Based on these fi ndings, the offi cer was arrested and charged with murder. Fortunately, Sir Sydney Smith, the famous professor of forensic medicine, examined the robber's clothing and considered context-the infl uence of body position and posture. The offi cer had told the truth. The single shot had entered the robber's back, penetrated his torso, exited his abdomen, and entered his front thigh, which was lifted high while he was running. Smith tested his theory by reconstructing the shooting using a dummy and the robber's clothing and later confi rmed it by exhuming the subject's body.
This represents a classic case of interpretation error involving physical evidence.
Confi rmation (or verifi cation) bias constitutes a type of selective thinking whereby individuals notice or search for evidence that confi rms their theory while ignoring or refusing to look for contradicting information. 25 Efforts to only verify and not falsify a hypothesis often fail. After all, a single item of refuting data (e.g., DNA exclusion) can outweigh a mass of evidence against a suspect. The components of confi rmation bias include failure to seek evidence (e.g., a suspect's alibi) that would disprove the theory, failure to use such information if found, failure to consider alternative hypotheses, and failure to evaluate evidence diagnosticity.
Sometimes, data that appears to support one theory (or suspect) actually has little diagnostic value because it also equally applies to other theories (or suspects). For example, during the trial of a man accused of murdering a 9-yearold neighbor, the prosecutor suggested that his failure to attend the child's funeral was evidence of consciousness of guilt. 26 Defense counsel argued that his attendance could just as easily been adduced as indicative of guilt because detectives typically try to identify those who attend a murder victim's " " Events may appear correlated when, in fact, they are not.
funeral in the hope that the killer shows up. 27 The man was convicted but later exonerated through DNA testing. A public inquiry found that the man's "failure to attend the funeral or funeral home was worthless evidence and ought not be have been admitted.... The leading of this evidence demonstrated that the prosecution sought to squeeze every drop out of the information available to them, to support their case." 28 In other words, the evidence had no diagnosticity.
Studies have shown vivid information has more infl uence than abstract data.
29 Personal accounts carry more weight than statistical information, even though the latter is compiled from many personal accounts. The vividness of eyewitness descriptions often overwhelms other information. For instance, authorities have pursued major investigations based on graphic allegations from "victims" of organized satanic cults and "eyewitnesses" seeking attention.
Investigators often fail to account for the absence of evidence, something that can prove quite important under certain circumstances. In Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's Silver Blaze, Inspector Gregory asks Sherlock Holmes, "Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?" Holmes replies, "To the curious incident of the dog in the nighttime." Gregory says, "The dog did nothing in the nighttime." Holmes responds, "That was the curious incident." Holmes meant that the dog would have barked at a stranger. Because he did not, the culprit was likely a member of the household.
Finally, impressions remain even after the initial evidence they were based on is discounted. 30 Often termed the "curse of knowledge," this can lead to contrived theories that theories make for interesting mystery novels but have limited value in the real world.
CONCLUSION
"I'm not sure I agree with you 100 percent on your police work, there, Lou." 31 Perhaps, real investigators can learn from fi ctional ones who rarely jump to conclusions. While often a plot device to help heighten suspense, the identity of the offender becomes known only at the end of the story. This offers the important lesson of keeping all options open. After all, the wrong mind-set and a limited organizational approach undermines the potential benefi ts of advanced forensic techniques, comprehensive criminal databases, and highly skilled police personnel. By recognizing cognitive biases and employing strategies to counter their infl uence, law enforcement agencies can take steps to avoid investigative failures.
Part two of this article will focus on probability errors and organizational traps. It also will offer recommendations and additional strategies for avoiding these hazards. 15 Small deviations in the starting position can become large ones over time. In Poe's The Gold Bug, a code written on a scrap of parchment contains directions to a buried chest. To fi nd it, the searchers must shoot a bullet through the left eye of a skull nailed to a tree limb, then measure 50 feet out along a line from the trunk through the point where the shot hit. They initially dig in the wrong place because they drop a gold beetle (substituted for the bullet) through the skull=s right eye; this error causes them to miss the chest by several yards. The distance between the left and right eye sockets is less than 3 inches, but this short offset is magnifi ed more than 10 times when measured out 50 feet; see E.A. 
